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Eduardo Gana and 
Armando Di Filippo 
The present article is structured around several basic 
ideas. In the first place, attention is drawn to the 
twofold character of Latin American unity, with ref-
erence to the close interdependence between region-
al 'inward-directed' co-operation policies which fos-
ter development and 'outward-directed' concerted 
measures which reduce the region's external vulnera-
bility. In addition, emphasis is placed on the struc-
tural root of that vulnerability, in the economic 
sphere, associated with Latin America's peripheral 
position in the international order, and reflected in 
the gradual dwindling of the share of Latin American 
exports in world trade. The structural resolution of 
this problem of peripheral status implies restoring 
the economic and social development of each and all 
of the Latin American countries to the central place 
that is due to it in the action taken by the State, by en-
trepreneurs and by the other social agents. The world 
order has entered upon a period of uncertainty 
which looks likely to be prolonged, and the Latin 
American countries must find a way to evade the 
danger of fragmentation and isolation by stepping up 
their efforts on behalf of regional co-operation and 
integration. The lethargy into which economic inte-
gration programmes have lapsed today is not at-
tributable to 'an instrumental crisis' but, in essence, to 
the slackening of the drive for industrial develop-
ment and the recent —but inevitably fleeting— phase 
of international financial permissiveness, which has 
sustained the equally fleeting development styles 
founded on international borrowing. It is also 
suggested in the introduction to the article that the 
strengthening of regional co-operation and integra-
tion does not imply increasing confrontation with the 
centres, but represents an additional and au-
I 
Introduction 
When the Executive Secretary of ECLA pre-
sented to the social communication media a pro-
visional balance-sheet of the Latin American 
economy during the year 1982, he stated that in 
view of the gravity of the negative effects on the 
region produced by the international crisis, 
ECLA, in fulfilment of its responsibilities, would 
immediately embark upon an internal process 
of collective reflection with the aim of offering 
its ideas to the Latin American governments, as 
possible means of constructing a joint response 
on the part of the region to this dramatic con-
juncture. The following pages are the authors' 
personal contribution to the exercise that ECLA 
is carrying out. Accordingly, they are open to 
constructive criticism for their improvement. It 
is hoped that some of the ideas expressed may 
give rise to fruitful discussion and that they may 
be of some use to the governments and to the 
private, academic and political sectors of the 
Latin American countries. 
There are certain idées-force which serve as 
guidelines for the present study. The first of 
these is the need to reduce the region's external 
vulnerability, which has betrayed itself in its full 
dimensions in the recent international cir-
cumstances. Suffice it to refer here to the drastic 
proportions attained by the problem of external 
indebtedness in many of the Latin American 
countries and by the South Atlantic conflict. 
Both are attended by negative sequels which will 
hinder the recovery of regional development. 
The second of the main ideas underlying 
the present article is that there is no clear-cut 
differentiation between regional 'inward-di-
rected' co-operation policies and 'outward-di-
rected' concerted measures, since the two are 
closely interdependent. Any 'inward-directed' 
progress —especially in the field of co-opera-
tion for development— has its 'outward-di-
rected' projections, inasmuch as it enhances the 
region's importance in the world assemblage 
and increases its bargaining power in the sphere 
of international economic relations. 
The third central idea relates to the struc-
tural character of this vulnerability. In other 
words, as long as Latin America's position in the 
tochthonous way of reactivating and dynamizing the 
world economy, and buttressing a multipolar world, 
capable of counteracting the risks implicit in the 
present East-West confrontation, which are a threat 
to Latin America as well. 
'Director, international Trade and Development Di-
vision of ECLA. Co-ordinator, Project on Regional Integra-
tion and Co-operation. Staff member, International Trade 
and Development Division. 
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system of international economic relations is not 
rectified, there will always be a dangerous gap in 
its external sector, since world demand for its 
primary commodities is invariably less dynamic 
than Latin American demand for the manufac-
tured products which it buys to enable it to keep 
up adequate levels of economic activity. In pres-
ent circumstances this state of affairs has been 
aggravated, inasmuch as it is making itself col-
lectively felt in all the developing countries be-
cause of the crisis by which the industrialized 
countries are affected, and as a result of which 
their demand for primary commodities has con-
tracted and the protectionist trends that have 
traditionally hampered regional exports to their 
markets have been exacerbated. 
Consequently, the study draws attention to 
a fourth idée-force: the need to change the na-
ture of Latin America's insertion in the world 
economy, to which end the economic and social 
development of each and all of the Latin Ameri-
can countries must be reinstated in the central 
place it should occupy among the concerns of 
the States, the private sectors and the other so-
cial agents. This implies looking at renegotiation 
of the debt and external financing in their true 
perspective: as instruments of the countries' de-
velopment and not as a set of problems with a 
life of its own, separate from the rest of the 
economy. 
Furthermore, the study posits the need to 
reinvigorate regional co-operation and integra-
tion, as one of the most fitting means of making 
a joint response to the international crisis and 
securing for Latin America a more assured 
place and stronger voice in the concert of na-
tions. This possibility would be favoured by the 
renewed importance that economic develop-
ment —both national and regional— would ac-
quire. The path of integrated economic de-
velopment may lead to a change in the asym-
metrical and vulnerable position of the 
peripheral region. This trend must be visualized 
as a long-term incentive to dynamism and struc-
tural equilibrium, based on the gradual elimina-
tion of the centre-periphery dichotomy, which 
implies asymmetries in power and distributive 
inequalities that are clearly untenable from a 
broader historical viewpoint. 
T h e need to co-operate on the intra-re-
gional level and to join forces for concerted ac-
tion in the international sphere is becoming a 
matter of urgency for the Latin American coun-
tries in the present historial conjuncture. The 
world order has entered upon a period of un-
certainty which is likely to be prolonged. In the 
monetary and financial area, changes of impor-
tance will continue to take place both in the sys-
tems providing liquidity to world trade and in 
the structure of international financing itself. In 
the field of trade, patterns of 'balanced and 
managed' trade are being imposed in the indus-
trial centres, in disregard of the norms laid 
down by GATT and of the claims voiced 
through UNCTAD by the peripheral countries. 
Moreover, in the area of production, the reces-
sive anti-inflationary policies applied by the 
centres depress their levels of activity and em-
ployment, thus fostering the growth of protec-
tionism. At a deeper level and in a longer-term 
perspective, there are signs of unpredictable 
changes in the technological sphere, which will 
affect the distribution of world production ca-
pacity. The fragmentation and isolation of the 
Latin American countries do not seem to afforo' 
the best means of coping with the vitally impor-
tant changes whose advent is sooner or later to 
be expected. Co-operation is the way not only to 
promote more dynamic and equitable regional 
development, but also to ensure the increase 
—or at least to prevent the progressive deterio-
ration— of Latin America's importance in the 
world order. 
The study indicates the close interrelation-
ship between industrialization and economic in-
tegration. The loss of dynamism in economic 
development caused a break, in its turn, in the 
constant support accorded by the Latin Ameri-
can countries to industrial development, which, 
to attain full viability, requires the integration of 
markets and the harmonization of national poli-
cies. This accounts for the present lethargic 
state of the economic integration schemes 
operating in the area. 
On many occasions recourse has been had 
to the convenient argument that this is an 'in-
strumental crisis' of schemes that were con-
ceived in international circumstances different 
from those of today and were endowed with im-
plementation mechanisms which necessarily re-
quire bringing up to date. Thus no heed is taken 
of the reason really underlying the crisis of inte-
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gration schemes: the weakening of the coun-
tries' economic and social development and con-
sequently of the industrial development pro-
cess. Of course, postulating so direct a relation 
between economic integration and industrializa-
tion by no means implies that integration can or 
should disregard other sectors of economic ac-
tivity. On the contrary, experience points to the 
necessity of taking action quickly and in depth 
in the sphere of food and agriculture, for exam-
ple. 
As a corollary to the analysis and to the 
close interconnection of the guiding ideas be-
hind the present article, the conclusion reached 
is that regional co-operation and integration, 
needs strengthening, and that this course 
should not be viewed by the industrialized coun-
tries as a form of confrontation on Latin Ameri-
ca's part. Quite the contrary. A Latin America 
that formed a dynamic and constantly growing 
political whole would become a positive factor in 
the reactivation of the international economy, 
the only way to weather the present crisis. From 
a different angle, the region's greater capacity 
to take joint measures would help to maintain a 
multipolar world which is a safeguard for the 
preservation of peace, especially in the context 
of the present East-West confrontation which 
now begins to loom threateningly over Latin 
America. 
Inevitably, all this poses the question of 
how it is to be done. To that universal interroga-
tive no categorical reply has been given, for the 
simple reason that there is no facile nostrum or 
miraculous panacea. In the present article, how-
ever, attention is drawn to possible joint mea-
sures in the fields of trade, financing, food and 
agriculture and energy, because these four are 
thought to constitute the essence of the region's 
economic security, indispensable for attenuat-
ing its external vulnerability. 
In the framework of these reflections, the 
present article advocates regional co-operation 
and integration as a fruitful line of action which 
must be pursued more firmly and in greater 
depth in order to surmount on structural foun-
dations the Latin American crisis of today. 
II 
Development and co-operation 
1. The frame of reference 
The economic crisis which in greater or lesser 
degree is affecting all the countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean has had no prece-
dent in depth and far-reaching extent since the 
time of the Great Depression. Not only the 
causes that have brought it about, but also poli-
cies for overcoming it, have thus become one of 
the burning questions of today. 
Never have conceptual positions as to the 
economic policies to be pursued in this 
emergency been so sharply polarized in the re-
gion as now, when the singular and paramount 
point of departure is the immense burden of ex-
ternal debt carried by the great majority of the 
Latin American countries. This indebtedness 
and the indubitable responsibility borne by the 
internal policies applied, especially those with a 
monetary bias that have accompanied the main 
economic decisions in recent times, are leading 
the national economies of the region into a pain-
ful and apparently inevitable process of adjust-
ment, with the all-too-well-known conse-
quences in the shape of a fall in the gross na-
tional product, unemployment, reduction of im-
ports, bankruptcy of enterprises, etc. ' 
A fuller appreciation of this crisis calls for 
a recapitulation, however brief, of the historical 
and structural content of the concept of de-
velopment, with the object of making it the focal 
point of the argument. 
The aim pursued here is to revert to 
'See ECLA, Provisional balance-sheet of the Latin Ameri-
can economy during 1982, E/CEPAL/L.279, 21 December 
1982. 
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analytical viewpoints based on 'idées-force', deep-
rooted in Latin America's and ECLA's economic 
and social thinking. Unfortunately, the reper-
cussions of the world crisis on regional develop-
ment have generated a certain 'immediatist' 
bedazzlement, which obscures the horizon of 
options and makes for a dangerous separation 
of efforts to overcome the serious effects —in-
debtedness, internal deficits, unemployment, 
etc.— of the crisis in question. This immediatist 
outlook also draws sustenance from the recent 
vigorous upsurge —or rather the fleeting reviv-
al— of economic theories based on a quest for 
ahistorical equilibria and on the study of static 
comparative advantages, operative in a 'per-
fectly competitive' world where the asymmetries 
l of power are smoothed out and the significance 
of the historical and structural background of 
current processes is attenuated. All this is com-
pletely divorced from the concrete praxis of the 
relationship between Latin America and the 
centres. 
In face of these peculiar circumstances, it 
is not idly repetitive to recall, at least in outline, 
the structural foundations of the contemporary 
economic development process, and the place in 
it occupied by Latin America. Thus the 
economic horizon it not reduced to the single 
theme of the 'adjustment' that is being made 
through restrictions on expenditure, depression 
of current levels of economic activity and, in 
consequence, discouragement of capital ac-
cumulation and economic development. The 
necessity of the 'adjustment' is not disregarded, 
but an attempt is made to define it in the setting 
of a long-term historical perspective of develop-
ment. 
Stress should be laid, therefore, on the 
priority which must be accorded to the matter of 
development, and which imparts rationale and 
perspective to the set of partial measures deriv-
ing from the present conjuncture. In stricdy 
economic terms, development implies an in-
crease in the productivity of labour and a diver-
sification of overall production capacity stem-
ming from the consolidation and strengthening 
of manufacturing industry. Underlying this 
process is the systematic and permanent in-
troduction of technical progress, linked to in-
creasing labour skills and to reproductive capital 
accumulation. 
2. The peripheral position of Latin America 
It would perhaps be superfluous to dwell very 
much on the worldwide repercussions of the In-
dustrial Revolution, but a brief general re-
capitulation may be useful as a frame for the ar-
gument put forward here. In the course of the 
nineteenth century an international economic 
order gradually took shape, made up, on the 
one hand, of the central economies —deeply in-
volved with the Industrial Revolution— and, on 
the other hand, the peripheral economies, 
which, left on the sidelines of this industrializa-
tion process, did no more than purchase man-
ufactures in exchange for their primary com-
modities. 
The central societies succeeded in fully as-
similating the fruits of economic development: 
they enlarged their quotas of non-agricultural 
product and employment; left behind the stages 
of downtrodden subjection in their rural and 
urban class structures; speeded up their urbani-
zation processes, absorbing migrants from rural 
areas; did away with illiteracy and systematically 
raised their levels of education; placed scientific 
progress at the service of economic develop-
ment; achieved an occupational differentiation 
which reflected the higher levels of education 
and the diversification of production; com-
pleted the process of demographic transition 
and stabilization; and, in the international 
sphere, forged spectacularly far ahead of the 
peripheral countries in terms of per capita pro-
ductive capacity and purchasing power. 
The process which was born and thrived in 
Western Europe then spread to North America 
and subsequendy to Japan. The Soviet Union, 
in its turn, succeeded in joining the group of in-
dustrial societies and after the Second World 
War became the 'centre' of the international 
economic system of the socialist countries. 
There can be no need to repeat that the 
starting-point for a proper understanding of 
many of Latin America's current economic diffi-
culties must be its peripheral position in relation 
to this international economic order: a position 
that is not called in question by its being classed 
as a 'middle-income' region, according to quan-
titative stratifications which must blind no-one 
to the basic fact of its subordinate insertion in 
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the world economy. It is precisely this subordi-
nation which, together with the colonial heri-
tage of the past, sets its mark on the structura-
tion of Latin American societies. 
These latter assimilated in partial and 
slanted fashion the technical progress transfer-
red from the centres; maintained rural societies 
with a strong aftertaste of colonialism, especially 
in the Andean and tropical areas; generated ur-
banization processes characterized by hyper-
trophy, centralization and lack of synchroniza-
tion with industrial development; failed to make 
a definite break with the pre-capitalist stages of 
their rural class structures; continued to show 
high rates of illiteracy and imbalances in the de-
velopment of education; absorbed technology in 
such a way that the successive waves of moderni-
zation did not sweep along with them the whole 
of the productive system; and as exporters of 
primary commodities, witnessed a high degree 
of dissociation between their basic production 
and consumption structures; while the 
heterogeneity of their productive systems con-
solidated broad occupational strata in which 
productivity and income were minimal. In 
short, they gradually acquired the features 
proper to their status as peripheral societies. 
The region's history seems to suggest that 
great structural 'leaps and bounds' in the de-
velopment of the Latin American economy have 
always taken place in response to international 
crises and convulsions. This is what happened in 
the nineteenth century, with the beginning of its 
political independence; and in the twentieth 
century, with the first steps and further ad-
vances in its industrialization process, histori-
cally associated with the two world wars and the 
Great Depression of the 1930s. The intensive 
regional economic growth of the past three de-
cades was achieved under the 'leadership' of the 
expansion of manufacturing industry, and im-
plied an increase in the region's aggregate prod-
uct which exceeded the purchasing power de-
riving from its exports. Nevertheless, this man-
ifest progress in industrialization and develop-
ment did not succeed in changing Latin Ameri-
ca's peripheral position in the international 
economic order. In essence, the region con-
tinues to be an exporter of primary com-
modities, and this is the key factor determining 
its peripheral situation in the world economy, 
reflected in the chronic asymmetry and deficits 
in its trade with the centres. 
Since the Second World War, the share of 
primary commodities in world trade —even in-
cluding petroleum— has declined and, in conse-
quence, the same thing is true of the participa-
tion of the peripheral regions in the trade in 
question. 
According to the statistical data available, 
the billions of people sunk in poverty in the 
lower-income countries are to be found in the 
economies with the least degree of diversifica-
tion of production, whose almost exclusive sup-
port is their export trade in primary com-
modities. These are the countries which have 
most rapidly lost ground in the general ranking 
by per capita product and share in world ex-
ports. Their economies show a high agricultural 
component in the value of their total product; it 
reached 5 1 % in 1960, and 20 years later had de-
creased to 34%. Data published by the World 
Bank2 show that the share of manufacturing in-
dustry in their regional product rose by only 2 
percentage points in the past two decades, from 
11% to 13%. In 1979, the average per capita 
product of this group of countries amounted to 
US$ 230 and the size of their population ex-
ceeded 2 billion persons. 
Those of the middle-income developing 
countries that are not oil exporters —to use the 
World Bank terminology— which include many 
of the Latin American countries, have a per 
capita product six times higher than that of the 
first group. And in contrast to what happened 
in these latter economies, in which the growth of 
manufacturing industry slowed down in the 
1970s and dropped below their aggregate prod-
uct, the greater dynamism of the middle-in-
come countries was due to the vigorous expan-
sion of their manufacturing industry. Some of 
them, like the South-East Asian countries, Spain 
and Portugal —and more incipiently Brazil— 
had managed to export manufactures on a sig-
nificant scale to the markets of the developed 
countries, especially during the second half of 
the 1970s. 
Nevertheless, the share of Latin America 
zWorld Bank, World Development Report 1981, 
Washington D.C., August 1981. 
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as a whole in world exports fell from 11 % in 
1950 to 5% in 1980, a contraction which was due 
mainly to the fact that despite the progress in in-
dustrialization recorded in the countries of the 
region, no substantial change was introduced 
into the structure of exports, a high proportion 
of which —about 80% in recent years— still 
consisted in primary commodities. Although in 
the 1970s the region's exports of manufactures 
increased their relative share in world exports 
of industrial goods, from l%!in 1970 to 1.4% in 
1978, this was not enough to offset the deterio-
ration in the terms of trade for the basic prod-
ucts that the Latin American countries sell on 
the world market, even taking into consider-
ation that a sizeable proportion of these com-
modities consists in hydrocarbons. 
Of course, the income-elasticity of de-
mand is higher in the case of manufactures than 
in that of primary commodities, and, basically 
for that reason, trade deficits and indebtedness 
are chronic features of the position of the 
peripheries in the international order. The sole 
'adjustment' capable of definitively doing away 
with this asymmetry can only derive from a 
structural change in the specialization charac-
terizing the production and trade of Latin 
America —and of the periphery in general— 
whereby their production and exports of man-
ufactures can be expanded. Strictly speaking, 
international co-operation on the part of the 
centres in the sphere of trade becomes coherent 
over the long-term only if it is directed towards 
the expansion of industrial production and ex-
port capacity, and is carried out on terms and 
in conditions which make it possible to attain 
these objectives. Otherwise, the trade deficits 
and chronic indebtedness of the peripheral 
countries, including those of Latin America, 
will remain inherent in the logic of the world 
economy, as long as its present structural dy-
namic persists. 
T h e following sections of the present 
chapter re-state the advantages of regional co-
operation and integration for the promotion of 
a development style which will enhance Latin 
America's autonomy in the world order, which 
is based on a renewal of industrial expansion 
and which follows the paths of its own creativity 
in quest of social justice. This enunciation of 
values, which pertains to the realm of the desir-
able, is nevertheless an essential point of ref-
erence for estimating the viability of specific 
measures directed towards the end in view. 
3. Co-operation, autonomy and bargaining power 
As regards the future outlook, the long-term re-
lations of Latin America —and of the periphery 
in general— with the centres will probably be 
marked by a high degree of uncertainty, not 
only in the monetary and financial spheres and 
in the area of trade, but also with respect to the 
directions that will be taken by the future struc-
turation of production in the developed world. 
From now on —and for a period which it is dif-
ficult to determine exactly, but which is quite 
likely to be prolonged— the international order 
will be passing through a hazardous interreg-
num. In the monetary sphere it will probably 
be necessary to replace the dollar by a different 
and less conflictive symbol that is internationally 
acceptable, and to strengthen the institutions 
which give liquidity to the system and regulate 
imbalances in world trade. Undoubtedly, the 
present operation of IMF will have to be over-
hauled with a view to increasing the weight it 
carries and reorienting the unsuitable adjust-
ment strategies that it is currently recommend-
ing to the peripheral world. In the area of trade, 
the system of regulations centralized today in 
GATT and concurrently discussed in other 
world forums such as UNCTAD will have to be 
reconsidered. The increasing protectionism of 
the centres is reflected in the various forms as-
sumed by the 'managed trade' which is gaining 
ground in the developed world. In the sphere of 
production, the deep-seated and prolonged re-
cession not only reflects volte faces —and 
perplexities— in the economic policy of the 
centres, but also foreshadows profound long-
term changes in technology, linked to the shift 
in sources of energy, to the automation and 
robotization of production processes, to 
achievements in genetic engineering and in in-
formation techniques, etc. It seems obvious that 
these revolutionary advances will bring about 
radical although as yet unidentified, alterations 
in the structure and regional distribution of 
world production capacity. 
It must be emphasized that at the national 
level the Latin American countries will be able 
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to exert scant influence on the profound 
changes in the international order that are infal-
libly approaching. Not even the larger 
economies of the region can individually affect 
the trends followed by these changes in such a 
way as to safeguard their own national interests. 
Will the Latin American countries, then, 
be isolated lookers-on, trusting merely in the 
comparative advantages inherent in the past in 
their peripheral position? Will they confine 
themselves to ritual demands for the benefits of 
an international co-operation which is asymmet-
rically dependent upon the will of the centres? 
Will they surrender leadership in the orienta-
tion of regional manufacturing industry to the 
criterion of the transnational corporations? 
Questions of this type could be spun out 
further, but to do so would be a mere rhetorical 
flourish. It seems legitimate, however, to posit 
that the real and institutional achievements of 
Latin American co-operation and integration 
are the starting-point —both desirable and via-
ble— from which to increase the region's capac-
ity for defence and reaction vis-à-vis the dis-
quieting changes that are looming up in the in-
ternational order. This is obviously the external 
facet of Latin American unity, more necessary 
today than ever. 
a) Trends in world trade 
It seems unnecessary to recapitulate the 
characteristics and magnitude of the new pro-
tectionist measures which have been and still are 
being applied by the industrialized countries 
and to insist on the flagrant contradiction this 
implies with the postulates of trade liberaliza-
tion set up as basic objectives of the interna-
tional community. ECLA has devoted close at-
tention to the subject3 and has transmitted its 
conclusions and recommendations to the gov-
ernments. 
In the crisis that is currently affecting the 
world economy, the protectionism of the North 
acts as a serious constraint on the development 
of the South, whose exports it reduces in various 
'sophisticated' ways. This reduction, in turn, 
See, for example, ECLA, The external economic rela-
tions of Latin America in the 1980s, E-CEPAI/G. 1160,1981. 
brings down the foreign exchange income 
which the developing countries need to satisfy 
their import requirements, a key element in the 
maintenance of an acceptable rate of economic 
activity. To close the external sector gap, coun-
tries have progressively resorted to external 
credit, which has increased inordinately, while it 
is no longer possible to service the debt by using 
export earnings, as should be the normal proce-
dure. 
Consequently, the trade protectionism of 
the market-economy industrialized countries is 
one of the major causes of the bottleneck in the 
external sector of the developing countries, in-
cluding those of Latin America. Apart from the 
fact that the protectionist measures in question 
imply an infringement of GATT's express pro-
visions, they boomerang against the interests of 
the industrialized countries themselves, which 
are prevented from keeping up an export rate 
that would enable them to dynamize their 
economies and substantially reduce unemploy-
ment. For example, 40% of the United States' 
exports are destined for the developing coun-
tries. 
Furthermore, 1981 and 1982 were years in 
which world trade declined, this being one of 
the peculiar features of the international crisis. 
The result has been a certain loss of confidence 
in the international trade system, to which tes-
timony is borne by the decrease in the rate of in-
vestment in the industrial countries themselves 
and by the open conflict that has arisen among 
them with regard to their trade. 
This last is another of the special features 
of the world economic crisis. The GATT Meet-
ing at Ministerial Level, held in Geneva at the 
end of November 1982, was the first to be con-
vened at that level in the past nine years, and its 
results were disappointing for the developing 
countries, since their chief aspirations were 
brushed aside, owing to the focusing of discus-
sion on topics of importance to Japan, the 
United States and the European Economic 
Community (EEC). But the most interesting 
part of the whole business is what has happened 
in subsequent months, outside GATT. There is 
an obvious swing-round from a theoretical free 
trade to a 'managed' trade, as it has come to be 
called. For example, the agreement reached by 
EEC with Japan, early in February of the près-
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ent year, is a serious step in that direction, since 
for the First time Japan has negotiated a volun-
tary restriction of its exports to the community 
as a whole rather than to its individual member 
countries. The same may be said of the agree-
ment between the United States and Japan 
aimed at securing equilibrium in their recip-
rocal trade balance; to that end Japan has lifted 
some of the protectionist measures which it was 
applying for the benefit of its agricultural sec-
tor. 
In short, despite the rhetorical utterances 
of the G A T T Meeting at Ministerial Level, 
agreements restricting the expansion of trade 
are proliferating, to the detriment of certain dy-
namic comparative advantages, as well as of the 
consumer in developed countries, who will have 
to pay higher prices. 
In Latin America, the international crisis 
and the huge external debt have imposed ad-
justment policies based on a drastic reduction of 
imports as the most direct means of saving for-
eign exchange and using it for debt servicing. 
Through the adoption of this course, traditional 
intra-regional trade flows have been affected 
and commitments assumed by countries under 
the region's existing integration programmes 
have been vulnerated. This has been turned to 
account as one of the most cogent arguments 
adduced against the validity of such program-
mes as suitable means of coping not only with 
the international crisis but with the very de-
velopment of Latin America itself. 
In this context, the region must view inter-
national trade prospects as a major challenge in 
two directions. First, to consolidate, maintain 
and expand to the fullest possible extent intra-
Latin American trade, resorting for that pur-
pose to all the multilateral and bilateral 
mechanisms. Secondly, to construct, organize 
and exercise a collective bargaining power 
which will enable it to keep up a balanced trade 
with all parts of the world, in line with the 
trends of the moment, giving preference, of 
course, to the interests of the region and its 
linkages with other developing countries. 
T h e expansion of intra-regional trade im-
plies, in addition to a firm political will to 
achieve it, the need to call into play such trade 
measures as novel and efficient financial 
mechanisms which will make it easier and more 
attractive to import from Latin America than 
from third countries. Keeping u p a balanced 
trade with other countries or groupings of 
countries requires great internal solidarity and 
the determination to exercise collective bargain-
ing power in order to attain objectives of com-
mon interest to all the Latin American coun-
tries. 
b) Latin America's capacity for economic defence 
In line with the trends of the world econ-
omy, as set forth in the preceding paragraphs, 
much of the region's capacity for defence and 
reaction must come from the concerting of 
unified efforts in the spheres of trade, finance 
and production. 
In the field of trade, protection of the 
prices of the primary commodities exported by 
the region necessitates the adoption of joint posi-
tions in the framework of global approaches 
which do not 'pigeonhole' problems to an undue 
extent. Weight may also be carried in negotia-
tion forums by the unification of purchasing 
power vis-à-vis the centres, in order both to ob-
tain better terms of sale for the products that 
Latin America exports and imports, and to con-
cert measures retorting to the protectionist be-
haviour of the North towards Latin American 
commodities and manufactures. The concept of 
regional priority in supplies of primary com-
modities is closely connected with questions of 
regional economic security, which opens up 
promising areas of regional co-operation in re-
spect of food and fuels, for example. In short, it 
seems obvious that in this field fuller and firmer 
regional co-operation is the most meaningful 
way of overcoming the atomization and isolation 
which undermine the countries' bargaining 
positions vis-à-vis the centres. 
In the area of finance, indebtedness to the 
private international banking system will drag 
on with its present weight and structure for a 
relatively lengthy period. The primary need is a 
dynamic approach to the problem; the first re-
quisite for coping with debt servicing is the abil-
ity to go on growing and exporting. In default 
of quantitative and qualitative changes both 
within the countries and in the international 
sphere, exercises in the rescheduling of pay-
ments are precarious and short-lived. Payments 
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will therefore have to be subject to the expan-
sion advocated here. An elementary form of fi-
nancial co-operation among the Latin American 
countries is to agree upon common norms for 
the renegotiation of the debt which abide by this 
principle and withstand the imposition of inter-
est and surcharges that are calculated on bases 
completely divorced from the real potentialities 
of world development and trade and that ex-
ceed the costs initially envisaged when the debt 
was contracted. At the regional level, plenty 
of possibilities are opened up for progress to-
wards the perfecting of payments clearing 
mechanisms, the adoption of a regional unit of 
account, and other measures which, by sparing 
the use of convertible currencies, may facilitate 
intra-regional trade. Similarly, steps should be 
taken to strengthen credit instruments for fi-
nancing economic development and the expan-
sion of export capacity. All these lines of action 
will help to lessen the region's economic vul-
nerability vis-à-vis the centres. 
In the, sphere of production, too, regional 
co-operation has an 'external facet' which in-
creases Latin America's power of defence and 
bargaining in its relations with the centres. 
Thus, one of the few conceivable ways of secur-
ing a permanent 'symmetrical' linkage with the 
said centres is the development of productive 
and technological capacities of the region's own, 
which will meet some of the following requisites: 
a) that they be diversified, i.e., that they com-
prise both traditional and modern branches of 
production; b) that they develop in depth, i.e., 
that their coverage shall extend from basic in-
puts to final goods, using as far as possible capi-
tal goods of regional origin; c) that they be har-
monious, in that there should be no marked dis-
equilibria in productivity and growth between 
the various sectors and branches of the econ-
omy; and d) that they be self-supporting, so 
that, primarily on the basis of each country's 
domestic demand, supplemented with regional 
and world demand, they can meet basic national 
needs, and can steadily grow and improve. 
It can safely be asserted that no country in 
the region, however large, can attain such an ob-
jective on its own account. Accordingly, co-op-
eration and integration among the Latin Ameri-
can countries are undoubtedly efficacious in-
struments for bringing this goal within reach. 
In each of the fields mentioned, examples 
could be cited in greater depth and detail, but 
for the time being it will suffice to ratify the cen-
tral message in this connection. The interna-
tional order has entered upon a period of un-
certainty which is likely to be prolonged, and in 
which the bases of international co-operation 
have been and will be severely tried. In view of 
these circumstances, the Latin American 
societies can find a twofold and interdependent 
argument for co-operation and integration. In-
ternally, their task is to strengthen a dynamic 
and equitable regional development; externally, 
it is to increase their autonomy and bargaining 
power in the world order. 
4. The linkage between industrialization 
and integration 
a) Conditions for integration 
Economic integration is a political and in-
strumental response to the development re-
quirements of countries where industrialization 
is accorded high priority. In other words, it is 
economic development that opens the way for 
economic integration, not the reverse: i.e., for-
mal integration cannot suffice by itself to sustain 
economic development in depth. It should be 
made clear from the outset that the assumption 
on which the present argument is based is that 
industrialization is the dynamic nucleus of 
economic development, as has been shown by 
the experience of the centres itself, and, more 
recently, by that of the so-called 'newly indus-
trialized countries'. It is worth while to state 
explicitly that the priority of industrial develop-
ment by no means implies a voluntary and still 
less a strategic neglect of the other sectors of the 
economy, in particular that of food and agricul-
ture. 
The foregoing assertion is based on the 
relatively short but enlightening history of the 
efforts made in Latin America to establish free-
trade areas and common markets, as in the case 
of European integration. 
The classic tariff instruments on the basis 
of which Latin American integration has been 
promoted are oriented in two complementary 
directions. On the one hand, their long-term 
aim is a common external tariff, and on the 
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other, they tend to eliminate the tariff barriers 
which convert the domestic markets into 'water-
tight compartments'. Integration, in various de-
grees and patterns, makes for the formation of 
a regional market which is not only enlarged but 
also protected. This protection may indubitably 
reach levels which are favourable to import sub-
stitution and therefore give impetus to indus-
trialization. That is, industrialization and inte-
gration interact and stimulate each other. 
Past experience of integration program-
mes, however, bears witness to the fact that they 
represent a higher and later phase of indus-
trialization processes previously carried out at 
the national level. In particular, among the 
large and middle-sized countries of Latin 
America integration began with the Latin 
American Free Trade Association (ALALC), 
which had behind it a considerable prior degree 
of industrial diversification. 
The course of events in the region has 
shown that in periods when industrial develop-
ment has proceeded more rapidly and in great-
er depth, the economic and in particular the 
trade links between the countries members of 
integration schemes have notably increased. 
The Central American Common Market 
(CACM); the Latin American Free Trade As-
sociation (ALALC), today the Latin American 
Integration Association (ALADI); the Andean 
Group and the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM), are good illustrations of what has 
just been said, in the sense that while industriali-
zation was a central and top-priority objective of 
their member countries, integration at the same 
time reached the acme of its vigour, and, as its 
most visible expression, intra-subregional trade 
rapidly expanded. 
The reason for this lies not only in the spe-
cific changes undergone by the manufacturing 
and other economic sectors when the indus-
trialization process is launched and makes head-
way, but also in the resulting diversification and 
expansion of the exportable supply. Hence in-
dustrial complementarity and specialization 
among countries with similar or not very differ-
ent degrees of development are seen to be viable 
and worth while. In contrast, when industrial 
development is sluggish or the impulse to pro-
mote it is lost, at the same time expectations 
built on the fruits of integration vanish into thin 
air. Thus, an extreme case of the impracticabil-
ity of integrationist prospects occurs in 
economies that are simply and solely exporters 
of primary commodities. 
In the Central American Common Mar-
ket, for example, the 1960s undoubtedly witnes-
sed the greatest advances in integration, in re-
spect both of instrumental improvements and of 
expanding intra-subregional trade, which 
climbed steadily from 6.7% of total exports in 
1960 to 26.1% in 1970. This dynamism of trade 
within CACM coincided with a vigorous indus-
trial development drive, since the manufactur-
ing industry of the five member countries 
(Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras 
and Nicaragua) increased their output at a 
cumulative average annual rate of 8.6% be-
tween 1960 and 1970, whereas the gross domes-
tic product rose at a rate of 5.9%. In the 1970s, 
however, a marked decline in the industrial de-
velopment coefficient took place correlatively 
with the drop in the percentage of reciprocal 
trade. 
In its turn, the Cartagena Agreement, the 
ruling instrument of the Andean Group, ac-
corded the industrial development of its mem-
ber countries a leading role in the Andean inte-
gration process. Of the region's integration 
schemes this is undoubtedly the one that has at-
tempted to go farthest in joint industrial pro-
gramming, with the aim of securing economies 
of scale, more efficient utilization of the subre-
gion's resource endowment, and greater special-
ization and bigger volumes of production. In 
fact, in 1969, the year in which the Cartagena 
Agreement was signed, out of an intra-subre-
gional trade of US$ 96 million, 50% was rep-
resented by traditional products, whereas in 
1980, when subregional trade amounted to 
US$ 1 113 million (excluding petroleum), non-
traditional exports —mainly manufactures— 
accounted for as much as 88%. 
It is worth while to point out that for the 
purposes of the present study what is meant by 
industrialization is the development and trans-
formation of the manufacturing sector and its 
linkage with the modifications brought about in 
the rest of the economic activities by the action 
and influence of the change in industry itself. 
This sector draws labour out of the agricultural 
sector and in return gives it inputs and equip-
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ment for its modernization; generates activities 
producing the services required for the produc-
tion, marketing and Financing of manufactures, 
a process which in turn feeds back into industri-
al expansion; urbanizes and alters the transport 
and communications infrastructure; and influ-
ences, directly or indirectly, the orientation and 
growth of the public sector. Directly, through 
the requirements it creates in respect of physical 
and educational infrastructure, inter alia; and 
indirectly, through the social change induced by 
growth. This latter is reflected in the spheres of 
trade-union, party, regional, consumer-organi-
zation and other forms of social groupings 
which help to stimulate and channel the expan-
sion of the public sector.4 
It is the development and diversification of 
the economy caused by industrial development 
that provide the motive power behind more ex-
tensive and more varied trade among the coun-
tries members of an economic integration 
scheme. Of course this does not exclude the 
further possibility that integration, in attempt-
ing to create wider economic spaces than the 
domestic markets, may permit fuller and more 
efficient utilization of the existing installed ca-
pacity, through complementarity and specializa-
tion in industrial production and, in some cases, 
the creation of new productive capacities. It is 
unlikely, however, that this can take the place of 
industrialization as an essential spur to greater 
dynamism in the integration process. 
It should be recalled, moreover, that since 
a start was made on the recycling of the financial 
resources deriving from the increased income 
of the petroleum-exporting countries, changes 
of singular importance have been brought 
about in the economic policies of many Latin 
American countries. One of the salient features 
of these was the tendency to overvaluation of 
national currencies and liberalization of im-
ports, which was largely due to the copious in-
flow of financial resources stemming from the 
aforesaid recycling, and undermined the valid-
ity of the most classic integration instruments, 
such as tariff preferences and the financing of 
intra-subregional trade. 
4In this connection, see F. Fajnzylber, La indttstrializa-
ción trunca de América Latina, Mexico, Editorial Nueva Ima-
gen, 1983, chapters III and V. 
Overvalued currencies and tariff reduc-
tions implied, in practice, a lowering of con-
sumer prices for merchandise from any source, 
which detracted from the efficacy of the tariff 
preferences established in favour of other coun-
tries members of the corresponding integration 
agreements. Similarly, the ease with which fi-
nancing could be obtained for imports from in-
dustrialized countries tended to minimize the 
region's efforts to build up the equivalent of 
these credit facilities. The figures for the Latin 
American countries' external debt —about 
US$ 300 billion at the end of 1982-— speak for 
themselves as to the influence that must have 
been exerted by these financial resources on the 
orientation of the policies and instruments 
which animate reciprocal trade. There can be 
no doubt that the flow of external financial re-
sources has done much to deprive the regional 
integration programmes of vigour and support. 
The return to tighter conditions in respect 
of the international availability of new financial 
resources and the high level of indebtedness of 
the great majority of the countries of the region 
may perhaps restore the political will to revert to 
development patterns where industrialization 
and integration regain their priority. Otherwise, 
the critical phase through which most of the 
Latin American integration programmes are 
passing will continue, and no improvement or 
change in their instrumental structure will suf-
fice in itself to counteract the standstills or set-
backs that they are suffering. 
Thus, for example, the outcome of the 
transformation of ALALC into ALADI has 
been an agreement for whose objectives no 
explicit time horizon has been established, 
whose Secretariat is relatively weak, and whose 
terms largely correspond to the limited scope at-
tributed to integration in the present con-
juncture by several of the countries members of 
the scheme in question. The problem of infus-
ing new energy into the process will therefore 
be resolved only in so far as there is a vigorous 
resurgence, in all spheres, of concern for 
economic development in its long-term inte-
grated projection and industrialization is ac-
corded a preponderant place therein. An at-
tempt to rescue integration from its present 
state of languor by reconstituting its instrumen-
tal mechanisms may represent an immense ef-
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fort, and one that is not even very viable, unless 
international events compel the member coun-
tries to redefine development priorities and 
strategies. 
T o all this must be added the need for cer-
tain countries of the region which have shown 
that they are in the van of industrial develop-
ment to express their political will in favour of 
integration and co-operation measures which 
will revive the potential of the corresponding 
programmes existing in Latin America today. 
T h e foregoing observations on the new 
operational and development conditions in the 
world economy, the need for Latin America to 
embark upon innovative development strate-
gies, and the unquestionable interaction be-
tween industrialization and integration, suggest 
that a qualitative change may be expected in the 
guiding principles and practices of integration 
in Latin America. 
It should be recognized that the so-called 
'crisis of integration' is nothing more or less 
than a 'crisis of development' and of develop-
ment policies. T h e loss of a long-term perspec-
tive and therefore of a minimum of guidance 
for reproductive investment, as well as the ap-
parent boom conjured up by the copious inflow 
of external financial resources in the recent 
past, have confronted integration programmes 
in Latin America with a number of successive 
tests of viability. Their very survival is a 
phenomenon worthy of note, notwithstanding 
that some programmes have emerged in a con-
siderably enfeebled state from this veritable 'in-
tensive treatment' and will probably take a long 
time to recover their strength sufficiently to as-
sist in steering a new integration strategy, more 
in keeping with the prospects of the interna-
tional economy and with the real national cir-
cumstances of the Latin American countries. 
At the same time, there is indubitably 
ample scope for co-operation among the sub-
regional schemes and within each individual 
programme. Some of these fields of co-opera-
tion have already been described in a recent 
ECLA document.5 It should be repeated, how-
5See ECLA, Integración y cooperación regionales en los 
años ochenta, in Estudios e Informes de la CEPAL N" 8, Santiago, 
Chile, 1982. (English version only in mimeographed text, 
ever, that the launching of a great collective in-
tegration effort largely depends upon the mea-
sures adopted to give back their leading role to 
development and industrialization, in their true 
and complex political, social and economic di-
mensions. 
It seems advisable, therefore, to seek indi-
cators in the orientation and content of the 
Latin American countries' overall development 
( policies of how far the integration enterprise 
upon which Latin America embarked two de-
cades ago is viable, and what are the bounds of 
possibility. While no doubt is cast on the idea 
that integration increases the feasibility of 
achieving a more efficient type of development, 
which certainly improves the prospects of a bet-
ter-balanced insertion in a world of economic 
and political blocs, the question that arises is 
how far these evident advantages can outweigh 
the fact that certain domestic policies take a 
dubious view of mutual co-operation or the at-
titude of certain governments whose short-
sighted outlook is almost always baffled by the 
speed of events. 
On no account is it the intention of these 
comments to strike a note of pessimism as to the 
future of the linkages between the countries of 
the region. On the contrary, they aim at clarify-
ing certain causal relations, useful for delimiting 
the frontier within which co-operation and inte-
gration can be expected to function, and thus 
averting unnecessary frustrations and futile illu-
sions. 
Identifying not only the genuine political 
will that is concerned for the progress and con-
solidation of integration —i.e., the real exis-
tence of a 'vocation' for development and indus-
trialization—, but also those top-priority areas 
of co-operation where joint and solidary action 
should be taken, ought to be a task of 
paramount urgency in Latin America. Simul-
taneously, this study may lead to the conclusion 
that a regrouping of the countries participating 
in each integration scheme or the establishment 
of closer links between the most industrially de-
veloped Latin American countries and the exist-
ing subregional agreements, might impart 
under the title "Regional integration and co-operation in 
the 1980s", E/CEPAL/G. 1151.) 
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greater homogeneity and vigour to the regional 
integration process. 
Furthermore, the countries that have dis-
played most dynamism in their industrial de-
velopment are those best fitted to assume 
leadership in the consolidation and expansion 
of regional markets; it will also be incumbent 
upon them to help to create opportunities and 
options for the less developed countries or those 
whose development potential is limited. 
From another angle, the truncation of in-
dustrial development in Latin America by its 
relative backwardness in production of certain 
intermediate inputs and of capital goods allows 
plenty of room for its acceleration and for in-
creasing the autonomy of the industrial struc-
ture. Joint action in this field among various 
countries of the region confers their true di-
mension on such concepts as complementarity, 
specialization and programming, which other-
wise appear ex post as unrealistic; while at the 
same time it can bring to life an authentic inte-
gration deeply rooted in the national and re-
gional development potential. 
An additional conditioning factor, to 
which history bears witness, consists in that as 
long as industrial development is exclusive and 
tied to the consumer demand of certain limited 
sectors of the population, this state of affairs will 
tend to reproduce itself, thus reducing still 
1. Latin America's responses to the crisis 
a) Trade and development 
The role of regional co-operation and in-
tegration can be approached either in the light 
of the present international conjuncture or in 
the framework of the structural conditions of 
regional and world development. 
From the first angle, any spur to interna-
tional demand which may afford support to 
Latin American exports will obviously be desir-
able in face of the severity of the depression. 
further the participation of the various social ac-
tors in the different negotiating and operational 
organs of integration. All this would mean that 
both processes —industrialization and integra-
tion— would rapidly peter out. 
Lastly, it should be noted that industrial 
development, like every evolutionary process, 
passes through its indispensable 'learning' 
phases in an ordered sequence, starting with its 
establishment on a firm footing in the domestic 
market and then reaching out to markets pre-
senting increasing difficulty in respect of access 
and 'sophistication' of demand. In this context, 
the Latin American integration agreements 
have shown that they are an appropriate means 
of effecting a gradual and natural transition to-
wards fulfilment of the aspirations focused 
upon increasing the manufactures component 
in the region's exports. The figures speak for 
themselves in this respect, since about half the 
intra-zonal exports of the ALADI countries 
consists of manufactures, whereas these prod-
ucts represent only one-fourth of exports to 
the developed countries. In addition to this im-
portant qualitative fact, a point that will have to 
be borne in mind is the potential dynamism of 
the Latin American countries' reciprocal trade, 
which at present amounts to only one-sixth of 
the total trade of the region. 
The Latin American market can to some extent 
compensate the contraction in demand on the 
part of the centres, if part of its trade is diverted 
towards regional suppliers. This diversion of tra-
de is, first and foremost, a defence mechanism 
which at the regional lovel should be comple-
mentary to the equally necessary import substitu-
tion process at the national level. As long as the 
restrictive trade and financial conditions origina-
ting in the developed countries are maintained, 
these defence mechanisms seem economically 
needful and ethically legitimate. 
The long-term role of integration in world 
III 
International and regional co-operation potential 
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economic development should be regarded as 
necessary and fitting. Strictly speaking, there 
should be no incompatibility of opinion between 
the centre and the periphery as regards the 
mutual advantages that would derive from a 
strengthening of regional integration. But obvi-
ously, too, any assertion to that effect reflects a 
specific conception of the most desirable form 
of international system, and of the best way to 
deal with the deep-rooted structural crisis in the 
international order. 
If the developed countries acknowledge 
the need to do away with the present centre-
periphery dichotomy, they should show their 
willingness to agree in future upon a more 
homogeneous and equitable distribution of 
world production capacity and to collaborate in 
the promotion of a system made u p of a number 
of economic regions capable of achieving a di-
versification of production and exports in keep-
ing with the requirements of an expansion of 
world trade. Accordingly, they should accept in-
tegration among the developing countries as a 
positive step towards the attainment of a more 
dynamic, more balanced and more equitable 
world economy. More dynamic, because what is 
at issue is not a static optimization of the level of 
trade as it is structured today, but its expansion 
in consonance with the requirements of world 
development. More balanced, because stable 
participation in an expanding trade calls for the 
elimination of the structural constraints inher-
ent in the peripheral countries' position in the 
world economy; otherwise, the economies that 
find rigidities obstructing the progressive diver-
sification of their production and exports would 
relapse into the familiar pattern of deficits and 
indebtedness. More equitable, because an ad-
vance would be made towards definitively over-
coming the international vulnerability and sub-
ordination peculiar to countries like those of 
Latin America. 
In so far as economic integration has 
proved decisively beneficial, over the long term, 
to Latin America's exports of manufactures, it 
has also contributed to the attainment of these 
goals. 
In the long run it is to everybody's interest 
that the growth of international trade should be 
dynamic and that all countries should be able to 
enjoy a stable share in this expansion. It should 
be recalled that a substantial proportion of the 
existing problems stem from the trade deficits 
which affect the economies of most of the de-
veloping countries. To the equally permanent 
surpluses recorded by the central economies in 
that trade with the periphery, were of course 
added, in the 1970s, those originating in the pe-
troleum-exporting countries. Setting aside the 
historically specific question of petroleum, trade 
between the industrial centres —from the post-
war period to the beginning of the petroleum 
crisis— increased faster than world trade, since 
—as is worth repeating— trade in manufactures 
grows at a higher speed than trade in basic 
products at the international level, by virtue of 
the respective income-elasticities of demand for 
each of these groups of goods.6 
T h e diversification of production and ex-
port structures is a prerequisite for dynamic 
participation in the world market. By failing to 
expand sufficiently its sales of manufactures to 
the centres, Latin America has lost one-half of 
its share in world trade during the last 30 years. 
Except during the 'open and permissive' period 
which generated much of the present regional 
indebtedness in the second half of the 1970s, 
the Latin American market has been the main 
motive force behind Latin America's exports of 
manufactures. 
In short, if they are not to continue losing 
ground in the world market, the countries of 
the region must increase their efficiency and 
competitiveness in the production and export of 
manufactures. T h e regional market itself is the 
economic space in which exports of manufac-
tures can be kept up in the present critical cir-
cumstances, and consolidated in the longer run, 
thus acquiring increasing viability in the world 
market. 
b) The debt problem 
It has been remarked that the unity of 
Latin America has two facets. On the one hand, 
6This is an argument of key importance, the validity 
of which has been amply confirmed by postwar trends in 
world trade. Among the more recent contributions to the 
study of structural disparities between centres and 
peripheries, see Raúl Prebisch, Capitalismo periférico: Crisis y 
transformación, Part Four, Mexico, Fondo de Cultura 
Económica, 1981. 
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the growth of regional co-operation fosters and 
multiplies the development potentialities of 
each individual country; on the other hand, 
joint and concerted international action in-
creases the region's capacity for defence and 
riposte in the thrust and parry of world power 
relations. 
T h e present international Financial con-
juncture affords a perfect illustration of this sec-
ond facet of Latin American unity. The external 
debt problem ought not to be tackled separately 
by our countries, at least in two of its major as-
pects. In the first place, its renegotiation should 
not be dealt with piecemeal, country by country, 
either vis-à-vis private international creditors, 
or in the case of the International Monetary 
Fund. Secondly, the debt problem cannot be 
dissociated from the critical conditions at pres-
ent besetting Latin American and world de-
velopment. 
In relation to the renegotiation of the debt, 
and in face of the high degree of accprd reached 
by the international private banks, there is a vir-
tually obvious need for joint exploration, discov-
ery, organization and application of specific 
multilateral renegotiation mechanisms —or, at 
least, certain common basic criteria— which will 
enable the Latin American countries to increase 
their capacity for defence and reaction in their 
individual renegotiation of their external debt. 
T h e common criteria for rescheduling ex-
ternal debt payments should avoid falling into 
the trap of treating the financial problem as di-
vorced from world and regional development 
prospects. Nor is the application of the condi-
tionality of the Fund acceptable, designed as it 
was precisely for the purpose for dealing with 
specific cases, not to cope with the manifold 
economic, social and political repercussions of 
the world financial crisis. The economic philoso-
phy on which this conditionality is based, which 
has always been theoretically open to question, 
in present circumstances is inadmissible. A pas-
sive acceptance not only of the rates of interest 
applied without regard to the Latin American 
countries' growth and export possibilities, but 
also of the recessive adjustment policies im-
posed by the Fund —which, paradoxically, pre-
vent the expansion in question—, will signify, 
firstly, mortgaging the development process 
and, secondly, seriously jeopardizing the 
economic and political systems of the Latin 
American societies, particularly of those coun-
tries that are endeavouring to establish democ-
ratic systems on a firm footing. 
T h e recessive adjustment policies that our 
countries are being compelled to adopt not only 
imply an intolerably burdensome share in the 
costs of the world crisis, but shape a mistaken 
and counterproductive strategy for the recovery 
of the Latin American economy. 
Accordingly, this is no mere matter of a 'fi-
nancial problem' which is the responsibility of 
the debtor country. It is the very foundations of 
the international order —in its productive, 
trade, financial and political facets— that are at 
stake. Joint and high-level political solutions, 
therefore, must be urgently sought. 
2. Possibilities of action in the sphere of trade 
a) Background data 
Intra-Latin American exports currently 
account for about 16% of the total exports of 
the countries of the region as a whole. Exports 
of manufactures to the region itself amount to 
about 50% of total intra-regional exports. Thus, 
there are obvious possibilities of much more 
thoroughgoing integration in the field of trade. 
It should be noted, for example, that the intra-
regional trade of the European Economic Com-
munity countries represents approximately 50% 
of their total exports. Although Latin America 
has not the same reciprocal trade potential as 
the EEC countries are afforded by their great 
diversification of production, the region is obvi-
ously in a position to intensify its integration 
through a reorganization of its existing trade 
flows. For instance, notwithstanding its very 
high degree of capacity to produce primary 
commodities, only one-fifth of the value of total 
imports of such goods —excluding petroleum— 
came from the region itself in 1980, which 
means that here too a vast potential is opened 
up for the expansion of reciprocal trade. 
Co-operation in the sphere of trade can 
also be used to take advantage of a unified re-
gional purchasing power, through joint im-
ports. 
This is where the other aspect of Latin 
American co-operation comes definitely to the 
90 CEPAL REVIEW No. 2 0 / August 1983 
fore: the increase in bargaining power vis-à-vis 
the developed countries. In this domain, Latin 
America's potential in relation to the centres is 
not impressive, from the standpoint of the rela-
tive importance of its market and their sales. 
But the absolute figures involved are very high, 
and the significance of the regional market for 
some of the industrialized countries must be 
considerable in the case of certain specific prod-
ucts which it is necessary and possible to iden-
tify. 
It is with the United States that Latin 
America's chief trade links have been forged. 
Out of North America's total exports to the 
world —the data used here include Canada— 
approximately 15% is absorbed by Latin Ameri-
ca, or, more precisely, by Central and South 
America. The importance of the Latin Ameri-
can market, in percentage terms, for the other 
industrial regions is as follows: Japan, 6%; West-
ern Europe, 3%. 
Thus, Latin America's market carries 
more relative weight in the United States' total 
exports than in those of other industrialized re-
gions. From the point of view of dynamism, an 
increase is also observable in Latin America's 
importance as a customer of the United States.7 
As a buyer, its share in the expansion of the 
United States' total exports was as indicated 
below for the corresponding years: 1968-1973: 
10%; 1973-1977: 14%; 1977-1978: 16%; 1978-
1979: 15%; 1979-1980: 21%; 1980-1981: 20%. 
Furthermore, the North American market 
—including Canada— absorbs 35% of Latin 
America's total exports. The significance of the 
markets of the other developed countries in re-
lation to these exports is 4% in the case of Japan, 
22% for the countries of Western Europe in the 
aggregate, and 8% for the countries of the 
East.8 
Furthermore, it must be realized that any 
measure aimed at a reorganization of Latin 
American trade —both in its intra-regional and 
in its extra-regional effects— will depend deci-
7Throughout the 1970s the defacto devaluation of the 
dollar as against the European and Japanese currencies 
made for a shift of Latin American imports from those mar-
kets of origin to the United States suppliers. 
8See GATT International trade in 1981/1982, Geneva, 
1982. 
sively upon the behaviour of certain large and 
medium-sized countries of the region. Recogni-
tion of this fact is indispensable for a proper ap-
praisal of the regional market potentialities that 
do effectively exist, and of the most appropriate 
strategies for turning them to account. 
In Latin America's purchases from the rest 
of the world, the share of the three leading im-
porters —Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela— was 
57% in 1981. If Argentina, Chile and Colombia 
are added to the group of countries carrying 
most weight, the conclusion is reached that only 
six countries account for 76.4% of Latin Ameri-
ca's total imports. Incidentally, it is in these same 
countries —with the exception of Colombia— 
that the biggest percentage of Latin America's 
external debt to the international private bank-
ing system is concentrated. Consideration of 
Latin America's trade and financial problems in 
combination might be productive of favourable 
results in the corresponding negotiations, given 
the political will and active co-operation of these 
countries, because of their importance in the re-
gion's external relations. 
The same thing happens in intra-Latin 
American trade within ALADI. Of the latter's 
total intra-zonal exports those of Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela represented 73% 
in 1981; and the same countries absorbed 53% 
of intra-ALADI imports. Taken in the above 
order, their trade surpluses in that same year, 
expressed in terms of dollars at current prices 
(FOB), amounted to US$ 796, US$ 965, US$ 79 
and US$ 534 million, respectively. Colombia 
and Chile, for their part, showed deficits. The 
surpluses of Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela in 
the aggregate were equivalent to 19% of total 
intra-ALADI exports. Consequently, any signif-
icant effort to divert trade into ALADI will de-
pend decisively upon the behaviour of the large 
and medium-sized countries, as regards both 
stepping u p the percentage of their transactions 
and stabilizing their balances with the Area. 
b) Possible lines of action 
Among multilateral measures to preserve 
and expand intra-regional trade, the regional 
tariff preference to which the Montevideo Trea-
ty of 1980 refers is an instrument that might 
exemplify, firstly the will to intensify the inte-
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' gration of the countries members of ALADI 
and, secondly, the determination to adopt joint 
and solidary Latin American positions in negoti-
ations with the rest of the world. To ensure that 
the agreements reached are not merely symboli-
cal, it will be necessary to attain, even if only 
gradually, substantial margins of preference, 
capable of producing significant effects on the 
creation or diversion of trade, in keeping with 
the international difficulties of today. 
This mechanism has an eminently multi-
lateral character and should be promoted as a 
means of complementing the recent bilateral 
agreements concluded in ALADI. It is desir-
able, in this connection, that the success of partial 
agreements should not attenuate the need for 
active convergence towards more advanced 
stages of regional integration, which can only 
emerge from global commitments and agree-
ments of a multilateral character. 
The utilization of mechanisms of this type, 
however, may not suffice to sustain and pro-
mote trade in the present world conjuncture. It 
must not be forgotten that in recessive situations 
like that of today the Latin American countries 
may harden their positions in respect of trade 
reciprocity, in an attempt to reduce and in-
crease, respectively, their extra-regional im-
ports and exports. This increases the risk that in 
face of the existing difficulties administrative 
mechanisms and other non-tariff instruments 
may be more intensively applied, and may coun-
teract or annul the trade concessions deriving 
from integration programmes. In order that 
full use may be made of the capacity for defence 
against adverse external circumstances implicit 
in regional integration potential, such measures 
should be selective and discriminatory. Selec-
tive, because preference needs to be given to 
capital goods and intermediate inputs; dis-
criminatory, because they should not be applied 
to the countries of the region. 
In addition to the efforts already made in 
the field of trade through various integration 
schemes, new measures can be tried out in re-
spect of the diversion and creation of trade for 
the benefit of the region itself. 
The diversion and creation of trade in 
favour of Latin American suppliers would help 
to palliate the chronic deficits in the balance of 
merchandise trade vis-à-vis the industrial 
centres, to save foreign exchange through the 
machinery for clearing payments and to reani-
mate regional, production, by encouraging, as a 
first step, full utilization of existing installed ca-
pacity. But, in addition to these results, the op-
tion of diverting trade into the region —espe-
cially in strategic items of great importance in 
regional demand— would be an instrument that 
would strengthen the region's bargaining power 
vis-à-vis the rest of the world in general and the 
developed countries in particular. 
This instrument, which consists in Latin 
America's collective ability to restrict or suspend 
its purchases of certain lines of manufactures 
exported by the centres, can be turned to ac-
count both in keeping up the volumes and 
prices of Latin American commodity exports 
and in promoting the penetration of the re-
gion's manufactures into the developed coun-
tries' markets, where today they are subjet to a 
variety of'sophisticated' restrictions. 
This type of regional concerting of policy 
has close precedents in decision 44 of the Coun-
cil of the Latin American Economic System 
(SELA), adopted in 1979 and referring to the 
relations between Latin America and the Euro-
pean Economic Community. This decision lays 
it down that if measures adopted by the EEC 
—including the establishment or extension of 
self-regulation agreements— should have unfa-
vourable effects on exports of Latin American 
products, the Latin American country or coun-
tries directly concerned shall, if they think it de-
sirable, and irrespective of any bilateral measures 
they may deem fitting, consult with the other in-
terested Latin American States, in order to de-
termine the possibility of denning and, where 
appropriate, undertaking suitable joint action. 
This may include, among other economic, fi-
nancial or trade measures, application of which 
would be voluntary, the following: a) symmetri-
cal treatment applicable to exports from EEC or 
from one or several of its regions; b) directives 
for restricting or encouraging Latin American 
imports from those same markets of origin. 
The intensification of protectionism and 
of 'balanced and managed* trade currently ob-
servable among the industrialized countries 
suggests the possibility that Latin America 
might put into effect measures such as those es-
tablished in decision 44 of SELA, but of more 
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generalized scope. Mechanisms of this type can 
be made operative at the regional level only on 
the basis of full solidarity among the Latin 
American countries, with the support of a cen-
tralized and up-to-date information system, 
which will enable them to adopt decisions and 
take action in conjunction. The individual coun-
tries should make a careful and systematic sur-
vey of the markets of origin of their imports, 
which should be carried out for every product 
representing a significant proportion of the 
value of Latin America's global imports. In this 
way it would be possible to ascertain what reper-
cussions would be felt in the centres if concerted 
measures were adopted to restrict or suspend 
imports of products from specific markets of 
origin, as has been done in their own reciprocal 
trade by Japan, the EEC and the United States, 
cases in point having been analysed in a wealth 
of detail in the European and American press in 
recent months. 
This centralized, updated and permanent 
record of trade information should operate on 
the basis of official data furnished by the coun-
tries themselves, or through additional agree-
ments with multilateral agencies. Irrespective of 
the options as to the specific location of this in-
formation service, what does seem unquestion-
able is the need to create it, if it is hoped to set the 
joint machinery in motion. 
Another point to consider in the sphere of 
trade is the necessity of closely following trends 
in trade balances between the region and the 
main world industrial centres. This would make 
it possible to take timely decisions as to the 
opening of negotiations with countries main-
taining excessively large trade surpluses with 
Latin America. In face of an aggravation of im-
balances of this type, the Latin American coun-
tries could exercise their joint purchasing 
power, to which reference has been made, or 
apply discriminatory prohibitions or restrictions 
designed to restore the balance of trade, as is 
being done with increasing frequency by the in-
dustrialized countries. 
The diversion of trade towards Latin 
American suppliers might gain significant and 
rapid impetus if government entities took part 
in it, according preference to regional sources 
for their imports of inputs and other require-
ments, irrespective of a possible increase in their 
purchases from their own national suppliers.9 
An intergovernmental agreement on this sub-
ject might be a decisive factor in giving a vigor-
ous initial impulse to the diversion of trade from 
the industrial centres to Latin America, on the 
basis of purchases by the public sector. 
In this connection, it is worth while to note 
certain orders of magnitude. State purchases 
constitute approximately 40% of the total im-
ports of the ALADI countries; in 1981, these 
imports amounted to about US$ 95 billion, of 
which roughly US$ 38 billion were therefore 
government imports. T h e magnitude of this fig-
ure can be better assessed if it is further recalled 
that intra-ALADI exports in that year 
amounted to about US$ 12 billion. It must be 
borne in mind that of those US$ 38 billion only 
4%, i.e., US$ 1.5 billion, came from the region 
itself.10 If this proportion were raised to 30%, 
which does not seem unusually high over the 
medium term, the share of intra-ALADI trade 
in the member countries' total imports would be 
doubled. 
Only 11% of the Latin American govern-
ment imports correspond to 'tied' loans, and the 
remainder is subject to international standards 
of competition; of that remainder, almost one-
third is financed by IDB and the World Bank. 
In the area of capital goods, these two official 
banks finance three-quarters of non-tied and 
State imports. This implies the existence of a 
great potential for diversion of government 
trade in capital goods which deserves careful ex-
ploration. Here three possible lines of action are 
combined which in present circumstances 
should be encouraged: i.e., diverting trade en 
masse, providing incentives to Latin American 
production of capital goods, and obtaining fi-
nancing for that purpose from the major official 
development banks. 
Here it is worth noting that the main bene-
ficiaries of a reorientation of public-sector im-
ports towards Latin American suppliers would 
be private entrepreneurs in activities producing 
approximate ly 75% of State purchases favour their 
own national suppliers; this average obviously leaves room 
for substantial discrepancies from one country to another. 
10See Guillermo Ondarts and Carlos Correa, Compras 
estatales e integración económica, Buenos Aires, ÏDB-INTAL, 
Colección Cooperación Empresaria II, p. 49. 
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tradeable goods, and the services which support 
and complement these. In this case there is obvi-
ously a perfect complementarity, reciprocally 
fruitful, between the public sector and the pri-
vate sector, in which the former can contribute 
its immense purchasing power to bolster up the 
low levels of activity and the export potential of 
Latin American private entrepreneurs. 
This section should not be concluded with-
out express mention of two instruments of a 
partial character. The first consists in bilateral 
agreements on trade co-operation between 
pairs of countries; these agreements generally 
establish schedules of products subject to total 
or partial elimination of tariff duties and to 
periodic negotiations to bring them up to date. 
Measures of this type, falling legally within the 
definition of the agreements of partial scope for 
which provision is made in the 1980 Montevideo 
Treaty, are adversely affected by the occurrence 
of drastric modifications in exchange rates 
which abruptly alter the terms of trade. In such 
circumstances, tariff reductions lose their effi-
cacy as means of promoting and diverting trade, 
and it becomes necessary to explore other pos-
sibilities. Long-term bilateral agreements may 
prove a suitable instrument for maintaining and 
expanding intra-Latin American trade, grant-
ing credit facilities and alleviating the existing 
payments problems by saving foreign exchange, 
inasmuch as the parties can buy and sell in the 
regional market, where merchandise can be 
cleared against merchandise. There is a vast 
field of application for mechanisms of this type, 
not only in relation to manufactures, but also in 
respect of primary commodities, and even the 
exchange of the one type of product for the 
other. Of course, measures of this sort are justi-
fiable only in the framework of a set of 
mechanisms and agreements —both multilat-
eral and partial— which will ensure the smaller 
countries similar opportunities to diversify their 
own production systems and increase their 
intra-regional exports of manufactures. 
As regards these relatively less developed 
countries, the fields might be identified in which 
the collaboration of the more developed coun-
tries of the region could be of assistance in sur-
mounting obstacles proper to underdevelop-
ment or to special situations such as an imbal-
ance in fuel and/or power supplies, landlocked 
conditions, small domestic markets, lack of nat-
ural resources or shortage of skilled personnel. 
What is needed, therefore, is to explore, 
from a practical point of view, new production 
and export possibilities for the countries in 
question, particularly in the sphere of primary 
commodities and of manufacturing industries 
connected with their processing. Collaboration 
with the smaller countries of the region must be 
oriented not only towards remedying their 
weaknesses or deficiencies, but also towards 
more systematic and exhaustive utilization of 
their own potentialities. The results obtained at 
the last ALADI Conference with respect to a 
total opening-up of markets to lists of products 
of special interest to Bolivia, Ecuador and 
Paraguay, while not fully satisfying the aspira-
tions of those countries, represent a wise step in 
this direction. 
3. Possibilities for action in the financial sphere 
Of unquestionable priority in this field are the 
monetary and financial mechanisms that are 
aimed at facilitating the expansion of intra-re-
gional trade and strengthening Latin America's 
financial autonomy and security at the interna-
tional level, albeit mention will also be made of 
those financial mechanisms that are intended to 
encourage economic development. 
In the first of these connections, the pay-
ments clearance mechanisms currently in opera-
tion have made it possible to save convertible 
currencies in the settling of reciprocal balances 
in intra-Latin American trade. At the end of 
each period the balances outstanding between 
pairs of central banks are determined, and the 
net balances of each participant vis-à-vis the 
others as a whole. Obviously, the smaller each 
one's balances with the group as a whole, the 
smaller too will be the amounts of international 
currency effectively involved in the clearance 
operations. Similarly, the more liberal the credit 
lines reciprocally granted and the longer the re-
payment period, the smaller will be the quantity 
of foreign exchange effectively brought into 
play. 
The clearing system of ALADI (which in-
cludes the Dominican Republic) is now almost 
complete, since of the 66 possible agreements 
between pairs of Central Banks, 62 have been 
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signed. In 1981 the total amount of credit 
granted under the system exceeded US$ 9.3 
billion, i.e., virtually financed three-quarters of 
that year's trade. 
As stated in a recent report, through this 
system, from the time of its entry into operation 
up to the year 1982 inclusive, operations have 
been channelled amounting to more than 
US$ 50 billion, only about 25% being required 
on an average for the settlement of net debtor 
balances in the corresponding repayment 
periods. 
It is also pointed out in the report referred 
to that the difficulties encountered as the years 
went by have generally been of little impor-
tance, and the amount of annual operations has 
been steadily growing from the outset up to the 
present decade, reaching the above-mentioned 
figure in 1981. In 1982, however, the upward 
trend in the channelling of operations was re-
versed, and their volume decreased on account 
of the international crisis, its effects on the 
economies of the countries members of the sys-
tem and the adjustment measures adopted, the 
consequences of which it is hoped will be only 
temporary. T h e corresponding figure is ap-
proximately US$ 7 billion.11 
A special aspect of this mechanism, which 
should be developed in greater depth, relates to 
the exchange of services, including tourism, on 
the basis of the use of a special means of pay-
ment. This might be, for example, a Latin 
American travellers' cheque. A saving of foreign 
exchange could thus be effected, since only pay-
ments for the services in question would have to 
be covered, and such balances could perfectly 
well be incorporated into the existing clearing 
mechanisms, together with those of intra-Latin 
American merchandise trade, should the coun-
tries so decide. 
It is in trade in goods, however, that the 
principal benefits of this mechanism can be 
reaped. A dynamic expansion of each Latin 
American country's trade with the other mem-
bers of the corresponding integration area, com-
bined with a substantial increase in the amounts 
and maturities of reciprocal credits, would be a 
See Evaluación del funcionamiento del convenio de pagos 
y créditos recíprocos, y eventuales medidas destinadas a su perfec-
cionamiento, ALADVCAfM/lll/Boc.2, 21 January 1983. 
relief in face of the impoverishment of reserves 
and the growing indebtedness of the Latin 
American economies. Furthermore, if the re-
payment period in the ALADI system were ex-
tended, for example, to six months, it could be 
interconnected with that operating in the Cen-
tral American Common Market, provided that 
an agreement were reached on the rates of in-
terest in force in each case. 
In short, given the political will and the de-
termination necessary for rapid and effective 
action, a combination of the mechanisms for en-
couraging reciprocal intra-regional trade and 
financing may generate an ever-widening 'vir-
tuous circle'. A balanced expansion of intra-re-
gional trade would make it possible to increase 
the advantages already implicit in the payments 
clearance mechanisms, and, reciprocally, an ex-
tension of the maturities and enlargement of 
the amounts of financing, together with the in-
terconnection of payments systems, would en-
able reciprocal trade flows to expand and gain in 
flexibility. The result would be a steady decrease 
in the vulnerability of the trade and financial 
positions of the Latin American countries vis-à-
vis the rest of the world. 
Another pertinent mechanism is the Santo 
Domingo Agreement on Support of the Balance 
of Payments, which has worked satisfactorily on 
several occasions, and affords financing for 
countries with balance-of-payments problems 
on the basis of maturities and amounts that are 
still very limited, but are potentially susceptible 
of increase. It differs from the payments clear-
ance mechanism, however, in that the present 
generalized situation of depleted reserves and 
acute indebtedness obstructs, in the short run, 
any device that implies additional transfers of 
internationally convertible currencies. 
Much the same thing happens in the case 
of another interesting proposal formulated by 
ECLA, for the establishment of a financial 
safety net in Latin America, consisting of a com-
mitment on the part of the official financial in-
stitutions of the region to act as 'last-resource 
lenders' for a member country in financial 
straits that had exhausted the possibilities open 
to it in other extra-regional sources of finan-
cing. This, like the preceding proposal, is de-
signed to provide financial assistance to separate 
countries, but not to cope with a crisis like that 
of today, which affects almost all the countries 
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of the region simultaneously and in conjunc-
tion. 
It seems better worth while, in the existing 
circumstances, to explore Latin America's pos-
sibilities of participating more actively in inter-
regional financial institutions —such as Ar-
labank today, established on the basis of Arab 
and Latin American capital— which operate by 
tapping resources not only in Latin America but 
in other international financial markets. 
While encouragement should be given to 
these and any other initiatives capable of impro-
ving the foreign exchange position of Latin 
America without subjecting it to terms that are 
incompatible with its necessary economic reacti-
vation and growth, the most viable measures in 
the present situation are those which help to 
save the use of foreign exchange in reciprocal 
payments and those which permit the granting 
of reciprocal credits in the sphere of trade, on a 
longer-term basis than under the existing pay-
ments clearance systems, but organically linked 
with them. 
In particular, while some Latin American 
countries have at their disposal banks of inter-
national standing, the region as such has no 
institution in the field of commercial banking 
which is represented outside Latin America.12 
This is a serious lack. A regional multina-
tional bank, based on capital contributed by 
public and private banks in Latin America and 
even by the Inter-American Development 
Bank, and operating in the big financial centres 
both in the area of trade and in that of the sale 
of securities, would decisively reinforce the ex-
ternal economic security of the region, by serv-
ing as a bridge for co-operation among various 
regional and subregional financial institutions 
and supplementing the work done by IDB as a 
development bank. A bank of this type would 
facilitate the identification of areas in which re-
gional co-operation could be pursued in greater 
depth; it would improve access to more diver-
sified sources of funds; it would reduce the so-
called 'country risk' for foreign suppliers of re-
sources; and would provide support to public 
l2A considerable proportion of the following state-
ments and proposals are based on notes prepared by Carlos 
Massad, Director, Joint UNDP/ECLA Project on Implica-
tions for Latin America of the Situation of the International 
Monetary and Financial System. 
and private financial institutions at both the 
technical and the financial level. But it could 
also be of major assistance in futwfe renegotia-
tion or refinancing processes. 
If a specified proportion of the Latin 
American countries' reserves were deposited for 
administration in this bank, it would be pro-
vided with a solid basis of operations, which 
would shortly make it an outstanding institution 
in the banking field in relation to trade and the 
sale of securities, thus facilitating the removal of 
constraints which today hamper Latin America's 
access to certain capital markets.13 A bank of 
this kind could play a decisive part in the pro-
motion of intra-Latin American trade. In par-
ticular, it could serve as a clearing-house for 
long-term financial documents, arising out of 
reciprocal merchandise trade and expressed in 
a unit of account of the region's own, so as to 
make the greatest possible use of national cur-
rencies. 
It would not take too much effort, in terms 
of time or resources, to formulate a specific pro-
posal which could be subjected to the consider-
ation of governments; but this would require 
the necessary political impulse. 
In the present conjuncture, consideration 
should also be given to the possibility of estab-
lishing a regional unit of account which would 
facilitate the settlement of balances in services 
trade, including tourism, and of financial docu-
ments deriving from intra-regional merchan-
dise trade. As regards services, a system is con-
ceivable under which each individual country 
would issue documents expressed in a common 
unit of account, with its guarantee, convertible 
into each country's currency in accordance with 
the exchange provisions and rates in force in the 
country concerned. The same thing could be 
done in the case of documents underwriting 
long-term payments for intra-regional exports 
of goods, so as to facilitate this form of finan-
cing. 
A bank such as that proposed, as well as 
13There is a very close precedent for this proposal in 
the ambit of the countries members of the Cartagena Agree-
ment: i.e., the Andean Reserve Fund, which has played a sa-
lient role in the present conjuncture, by providing resources 
to some of the member countries, without subjection to 'con-
ditionalities' of any kind. 
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the common unit of account, may have dynamic 
effects on regional integration.14 
In the field of financial co-operation to 
promote development, the loss of importance of 
the international public banks in the present 
structure of international financing is a very 
serious matter. Latin America must strive to 
reinforce the Inter-American Development 
Bank financially, so that in its turn it can 
strengthen its role as promoter of regional in-
vestment. 
There is an obvious need for long-term 
capital contributions, such as those made by 
IDB, to promote co-operation in areas where 
production must be vigorously encouraged. 
Cases in point are the capital goods, energy and 
food security sectors. 
At the Annual Meeting of the Board of 
Governors of the Bank, held in Panama early in 
1973, the Sixth Replenishment of Resources was 
approved, in a resolution adopted by the Com-
mittee of the Board of Governors. The increase 
provided for is US$ 15 billion in the authorized 
capital and 703 million in the resources of the 
Fund for Special Operations. Another subject 
of discussion was the creation of a mechanism 
—the Inter-American Investment Corpora-
tion— directed towards financing Latin Ameri-
can enterprises, with particular emphasis on the 
private area. 
There is another special aspect of IDB's ac-
tion which would also repay overhauling. The 
Bank's technical co-operation programme, 
which is generally run by consultants from the 
non-borrowing countries, could make more 
room for the participation of consultant firms 
from the Latin American countries, at least in 
respect of that part of financing which does not 
correspond to trust funds. This idea is prompt-
ed by the increase that has taken place in the 
proportion of the goods and services purchased 
with the Bank's convertible currency resources 
l 4What would be needed would be the political deci-
sion on the part of the governments to tackle such a propo-
sal, and they would have to take into account that this is no 
mere matter of creating a new Latin American institution, 
but a question of filling an existing gap. They may even take 
a gradual succession of steps in this direction, should it not 
be possible or viable to assign such a bank all its functions 
simultaneously. 
represented by those of extra-regional origin 
—a trend clearly at variance with co-operation 
and integration efforts at the regional level. In 
1973, purchases from extra-regional markets of 
origin amounted to 40% of those effected with 
funds lent by the Bank, and in 1981 this propor-
tion rose to almost 60%.15 It would be advisable 
to reverse this trend, above all if the purchasing 
power of the Latin American governments is to 
be used to divert trade towards regional 
suppliers. 
A common strategy needs to be concerted, 
which would make it possible to enlarge the in-
stitution's regular funds, and at the same time 
permit increased participation of regional firms 
of consultants in the formulation of new invest-
ment projects. 
By way of corollary, it may be asserted that 
financial co-operation at the Latin American 
level has become an imperative need. Since capi-
tal resources have to serve as the means to at-
tainment of specific economic and social de-
velopment objectives, it is urgently necessary to 
initiate at the earliest possible moment, a pre-
paratory phase of consultations at the political 
and technical level, which would be the prelude 
to an eventual meeting of the regions' Ministers 
of Finance where specific proposals like those 
mentioned could be put forward, so as to permit 
the adoption of decisions appropriate to present 
circumstances and to world and regional 
economic prospects. 
4. Possibilities of action in the sphere of regional 
development and economic security 
There are measures associated with regional co-
operation which are of great importance for 
buttressing the economic and social structura-
tion of the Latin American countries, and which 
affect, in the long run, the autonomy, the 
dynamism and even the equity of Latin Ameri-
can development. The aim of this section is to 
set forth a group of areas of particular signifi-
cance for the economic security and the de-
velopment of Latin America as a whole. 
See G. Ondarts and C. Correa, Compras estatales e in-
tegración económica, op. cit., p. 45. 
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a) Regional co-operation in the field of capital 
goods16 
The region as a whole constitutes an im-
portant market for capital goods. In the first 
nine years of the 1970s, investment in machin-
ery and equipment on the part of 8 countries 
(Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and the five mem-
bers of the Andean Group) averaged an annual 
sum of US$ 40 billion (at 1980 prices), and in 
1978 exceeded 50 billion. Not more than 50% of 
aggregate demand is met from within the re-
gion itself, which points to the existence of a 
considerable field for the application of con-
certed measures. 
A substantial proportion of purchases of 
goods of this type is effected by State or State-
controlled entities, which, in view of the small 
number of actors involved, would facilitate a 
possible co-ordination of measures, given the 
existence of the necessary political will. 
These measures might be directed towards 
the following ends: 
i) Obtaining better terms for external 
supplies, by demonstrating the magnitude of re-
gional demand through joint purchasing pro-
grammes, a step which, furthermore, would 
permit the real exercise of a purchasing power 
with modalities and purposes already com-
mented upon in earlier pages; 
ii) Partly reorienting this demand towards 
the region itself, by raising —qualitatively and 
quantitatively— the level of activity of the local 
metalworking industry. 
In both respects, more significant results 
will be obtained in so far as very specific infor-
mation is available on equipment requirements 
and local capacity to meet them. 
Some countries promote local production 
of capital goods through organizations group-
ing the public and private entities that are inter-
ested in the progress of the sector. The encour-
agement of such promotional entities and their 
A substantial part of the following material is based 
on notes prepared by Salvador Lluch, Co-ordinator of the 
ECLA Project on Capital Goods. For a more complete analy-
sis of the subject, see Jorge Beckel and Salvador Lluch, 
"Capital Goods. Size of markets, sectoral structure and de-
mand prospects in Latin America", CEPAL Review No. 17, 
August 1982. 
systematic interrelationship will conduce to a 
more lively perception of the opportunities 
opened up by joint activity, as regards both bar-
gaining with third parties and forming combina-
tions of production capacity; it will also facilitate 
removal of the obstacles which prevent these op-
portunities from being turned to account. Out-
standing among such difficulties is the lack of fi-
nancing mechanisms for internal sales, and the 
consequent hindrance of Latin American indus-
try from participating in the construction and 
sale of whatever equipment it is capable of of-
fering in conditions comparable, in terms of 
quality and price, with the external supply. 
In the unfavourable conjuncture through 
which Latin America is passing today, not only is 
it harder for the capital goods industry to make 
headway, but the very survival of the manufac-
turing capacity that has by now been achieved 
in some countries is being jeopardized. A joint 
surveyal of the region's requirements as com-
pared with its own capacities might help to avert 
the loss, in consequence of the present reces-
sion, of assets which it would be difficult to re-
cover, such as specialized teams whose educa-
tion training and maturation entail more time 
and effort than are necessary to ensure the 
availability of physical production equipment. 
All this should be regarded as a problem of 
regional interest. A weakening of the industrial 
base would reduce the region's capacity for self-
determination and would signify a general im-
poverishment; but it is also obvious that a collec-
tive effort to forestall such harm entails a certain 
measure of shared sacrifice, which could only be 
secured if compensatory mechanisms existed in 
favour of countries where manufacturing in-
dustry does not exist or is still embryonic. 
In the case of certain sectors of demand 
linked with large-scale projects, clearly located 
in time and space, consideration might be given 
to mechanisms deriving precisely from the 
execution of works that help to distribute the 
benefits of collective action. 
An outstanding case in point is that of hy-
droelectric i ty, since in the first place, it involves 
less likelihood of over-investment and, sec-
ondly, the repercussions of the corresponding 
civil engineering works may have a positive im-
pact on various important sectors that also need 
activation —steel-making, cement and construe-
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don, equipment, inter alia—, with the con-
sequent increase in employment. 
For co-operation in the field of capital 
goods to become more deeply and firmly rooted in 
the economic life of the Latin American coun-
tries, its promotion will have to be continued on 
the basis of active participation by the entities 
grouping private enterprises set up with Latin 
American capital. These, in turn, could unify 
their purchasing power in the world market and 
participate in it on preferential terms as Latin 
American sellers of the same goods. In particu-
lar, regional private enterprises supplying capi-
tal goods could join up with one another in en-
trepreneurial associations of a regional charac-
ter. There they could unify positions, concert 
common strategies in their bargaining with the 
transnational corporations and identify man-
ifold forms of co-operation which would enable 
them to increase their competitiveness at the re-
gional and international level. 
b) Co - operation in the field of food security17 
In Latin America the production and mar-
keting of food products —at the regional 
level— betray features that are clearly unsatis-
factory and susceptible of improvement 
through co-operation. 
It is easy to see how important the subject 
is, not only for regional economic security as a 
whole, but also with respect to combating the 
critical poverty which is still deplorably preva-
lent in Latin America. 
Although the growth of production out-
strips that of the population, it does not suffice 
to meet the increase in the effective demand for 
food and, still less that of potential demand, 
represented by over 50 million victims of mal-
nutrition who lack the necessary purchasing 
power to carry any weight in the market, be-
cause of the vices apparent in income distribu-
tion. Actual output falls far short of production 
capacity, of which only one-third is utilized. 
Peasant farmers have lacked adequate access to 
appropriate forms of land tenure, as well as to 
technical advisory assistance in the spheres of 
17Much of the following material is based on notes 
prepared by Luis López Cordovez, Director, Joint ECLA/ 
FAO Division, on the subject of food security. 
production, marketing and financing, in con-
tradistinction to entrepreneurs in the modern 
sector of regional agriculture. This has aggra-
vated the polarization of agricultural producers. 
There are some Latin American countries 
suffering from food shortages which import 
from the world market the very same products 
that, concurrently, other Latin American coun-
tries with surpluses are exporting. Recognition 
of this fact is essential for the formulation of 
guidelines in the sphere of co-operation in pro-
duction and trade. On the one hand, the re-
gion's capacity for food production is under-
utilized, and on the other, the contribution of 
imports to regional food supply rose from 9% to 
13% in the past seven years. Intra-regional 
trade in food —which accounts for 30% of total 
Latin American imports of such products— is 
therefore susceptible of a vigorous forward 
thrust. 
Almost two-thirds of these imports come 
from the developed countries and are concen-
trated in a few types of food —cereals, oilseeds 
and milk products—, which shapes the form of 
food dependence faced by the region as a 
whole. This dependence is aggravated by the 
concentration of such supplies in a small group 
of transnational corporations —especially in the 
case of cereals— and by subsidies to production 
and exports in the countries of origin, cir-
cumstances which distort competition and dis-
courage the corresponding national lines of 
production. 
In short, Latin America needs to step up, 
at the regional level, its quantums of food pro-
duction and self-sufficiency, both in order to 
meet its own unsatisfied demand and with a 
view to reducing vulnerabilities which might, in 
certain situations, affect regional economic se-
curity and the attributes of national sovereignty. 
The expansion of food production should lie at 
the basis of every social nutrition policy aimed at 
overcoming the serious regional dearths in this 
field. The diversion and creation of trade flows 
in food among the Latin American countries 
may thus give considerable impetus to Latin 
American co-operation and integration. 
T h e main causes of food insecurity —in-
sufficient production, aggravated by cumulative 
annual shortages, inadequate or non-existent 
reserves and emergency imports at relatively 
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high costs— are common to most of the coun-
tries of the region, a fact which unquestionably 
facilitates concerted measures in this field. In-
formation and alerting systems are necessary 
which will enable deficit countries to obtain im-
ports more rapidly from other Latin American 
countries with surpluses. Here too comes into 
play the possibility of improving bargaining 
conditions in the world market through joint 
purchases. Last but not least, concerted efforts 
must be made to increase food production 
through the exchange of experience, tech-
nologies and specialists, as well as through com-
mon programmes to induce the utilization of 
idle production capacity. Perhaps in the short 
run regional co-operation with emphasis on 
pre-production aspects —regionalization, cred-
it, productivity, etc.— may have more beneficial 
effects on regional food security. 
c) Co-operation in the field of energy 
It would be hard to overlook the supreme 
significance of the energy question in the study 
of the dynamics and orientation of Latin Ameri-
ca's economic development. The importance of 
hydrocarbons in fuel supplies and their rising 
costs on the world market have involved, for 
many countries, familiar problems in the shape 
of trade deficits, inflationary pressures and in-
adequate supplies of fuel. 
The inescapable need to diversify sources 
of energy has a variety of repercussions on the 
patterns of Latin America's future develop-
ment. The lengthy period during which the 
world enjoyed mass supplies of petroleum at 
unjustifiably low prices whipped up a wave of 
products deriving from the petrochemical in-
dustry —or containing various inputs of petro-
chemical origin—, such as plastics, deter-
gents, fertilizers and various types of man-made 
fibres. T h e greater part of overland, air and 
maritime transport was based on fuels obtained 
from petroleum, and many of the technologies 
applied in the construction of housing and in 
the production of durable goods made abun-
dant use of materials of petrochemical origin. 
T h e preference for private cars, and the types 
of material used as inputs in their production, 
are of course among the consequences of the 
past era of cheap petroleum. 
Coal, natural gas and various organic com-
pounds of agricultural origin are competing 
with petroleum in the generation of fuels for in-
ternal-combustion engines and in the process-
ing of materials which used to be the exclusive 
domain of the petrochemical industry. Simi-
larly, solar, aeolian and nuclear energy are gain-
ing ground in the energy panorama of today. 
In the case of Latin America, a separate 
paragraph is deserved by the generation of hy-
droelectric energy, in view of the immense po-
tential available. 
Impressive progress has been made on 
some of these fronts during the past decade; 
cases in point are the Itaipú, Yacyretá and Salto 
Grande projects, and others envisaged in the 
field of joint utilization of hydro resources. 
Great strides have also been made in re-
spect of petroleum. The PETROLATIN project 
sponsored by the petroleum enterprises of 
Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela, as well as the as-
sociation between Mexico and Venezuela is an 
aid programme for supplying petroleum to 
Central America and the Caribbean (San José 
Agreement), are examples of what Latin Ameri-
ca can do in the sphere of energy, given the nec-
essary political will on the part of its govern-
ments. 
The development of energy resources on 
bilateral, multinational or regional bases is not 
easy to concert, but may have beneficial reper-
cussions on the profitability of investment and 
security of supplies. 
In the area of hydroelectric energy, Latin 
America was utilizing, at the end of the 1970s, 
less than 10% of its available potential. There is 
an obvious need to advance along this path by 
establishing co-operation systems for the evalu-
ation and planning of hydroelectric resources; 
for the more efficient utilization, management 
and conservation of hydrographie basins per-
taining to two or more countries; for the inter-
connection of hydroelectric systems; for the de-
velopment of the engineering and of the firms 
of consultants that these purposes require; for 
the improvement of bargaining capacity in re-
spect of the purchase of equipment not available 
in Latin America; for the training of personnel 
in the hydropower area, etc. 
For many of these objects of concern pro-
vision is made in a Latin American programme 
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on co-operation in the field of energy (Pro-
grama Latinoamericano de Cooperación Ener-
gética — PLACE), adopted at a meeting at 
ministerial level of the Latin American Energy 
Organization (Organización Latinoamericana 
de Energía - OLADE) held in Santo Domingo 
in 1981. It should be mentioned that OLADE 
—which co-ordinates the activities of PLACE— 
was founded in 1973, before the outbreak of the 
petroleum crisis, thus giving proof of early re-
gional concern with the energy problem. Today, 
in the era of the quest for new sources of ener-
gy, the role of OLADE is revitalized in every-
thing relating to regional co-operation in this 
field. 
d) Final considerations 
Unquestionably, the areas of co-operation 
described above are only some of the spheres in 
which concerted regional action can be taken to 
the benefit of the economic security of the Latin 
American countries and of the fuller and more 
diversified development of their production sys-
tems. At all events, the areas selected —trade, fi-
nancing, food and energy— are the cor-
nerstones of any programme aimed at reducing 
the region's external vulnerability. The capital 
goods industry, too, is one of the least advanced 
branches of production in the Latin American 
manufacturing sector, so that its development 
should be made one of the key objectives of re-
gional co-operation. 
It would seem inappropriate to bring this 
essay to an end without first stressing an aspect 
which has traditionally hindered the multilat-
eral undertakings upon which Latin America 
has embarked: i.e., the well-known hetero-
geneity of the countries forming the region. 
The inequalities in the extent of their territories 
and in the size of their populations, as well as 
the differences in their degrees of development 
and their institutional and political structures 
make it essential to take a realistic view of the ef-
fective capacity for concerted action of this part 
of the developing world. At all events, as these 
characteristics not only exist but have been 
gradually aggravated in the course of Latin 
America's history, it is possible that the force of 
circumstances created by the crisis may induce 
governments and peoples to adopt a more 
'Latin-Americanist' position, which will enable 
the region to surmount the obstacles raised by 
heterogeneity and make unhampered use of its 
joint potentialities. 
This will mean that in programming to 
find a way out of the economic and social 
emergency priority will have to be given to con-
sidering the situation of the economically less 
developed Latin American countries, so that 
they may not be so much harder hit by the crisis 
than the rest, and proof may be afforded that 
the solidarity asked from the developed world 
also 'begins at home'. 
